讲座题目 | Confucian Game Theory | ||
主讲人 （单位） | 俞宁 （南京审计大学） | 主持人 （单位） | 薛巍立 （永利平台） |
点评人 （单位） | 宋铮 （香港中文大学） | ||
讲座时间 | 2025年7月21日 2:00-3:30 | 讲座地点 | 四牌楼校区春晖堂 |
主讲人简介 |
俞宁，南京审计大学社会与经济研究院教授，国家杰出青年科学基金获得者、教育部青年长江学者、江苏特聘教授。上海交通大学管理学博士、斯坦福大学经济学博士，曾任埃默里大学助理教授。研究领域包括博弈论、市场设计、微观行为。任关键作者的论文见诸American Economic Review、Review of Economic Studies等期刊，获孙冶方经济科学奖、高等学校人文社会科学一等奖和二等奖、江苏省哲学社会科学一等奖。个人获中国信息经济学乌家培奖、张培刚发展经济学青年学者奖、中国运筹学会青年科技奖、霍英东青年科学奖二等奖。 | ||
讲座内容摘要 | Abstract: To rectify the prejudice that "Confucianism lacks a systematic framework and is inferior to Western learning," we trace back to its origins and summarize its logic as "from Ren (仁, empathy-based benevolence) to De (德, virtue) to Yi (義, improving social welfare)." A game-theoretic model elucidates the rigorous logic underlying "the Way of Ren and Yi." In this model, De is defined as prosocial behavior that increases others' self-regarding utility—that is, altruistic actions; Ren corresponds to benevolent social preferences and serves as the motivation for De; Yi corresponds to social welfare and represents the goal of De. Using monotone comparative statics techniques, we prove that, under simple assumptions, Ren enhances De in individual decision-making and Nash equilibria. Given the conclusion that "Ren begets De" and the assumption that "De begets Yi," it follows that "Ren begets Yi:" the more benevolent the social preferences, the higher the social welfare. This analytical framework unifies many known results about prosocial behaviors, filling gaps in the literature of social preferences. Focusing on simple 2x2 games, we derive explicit solutions, with the two classic cooperation coordination games—the "Prisoner's Dilemma" and the "Stag Hunt"—as special cases. This modern view of Confucianism is supported by reliable records on Confucius and his most influential interpreter in Mencius. | ||
